A revocation list can often be lazily replicated and doesn't require the complexity of distributed synchronization.
If you store sessions then you need to ensure the session has been replicated to every node before you can return it to the user. For revocation lists it is often acceptable that the token is still valid for a short while at some nodes while it is being replicated.
A revocation list is also not considered highly sensitive data, which would be another complexity layer when working with distributed data.
So I just wasted my time reading through this garbage and I can't find anything that debunks what you claimed it does? The whole thing boils down to Israel fired a lot of ammunition, therefore it was actually Israel killing all the civilians.
On top of that, the whole article is mainly sourcing from "The Electronic Intifada", which definitely seems like the most objective source for objective truth on Oct 7th.
The devil is in the linked documents. The whole thing boils down to multiple claims primarily from the Israeli sources (press), but also public statements of the officials.
You seem to be suggesting it's all about the Hannibal Directive. It's not all.
And the thing you call "garbage" is for example the defense minister (Yoav Gallant) who was in power on Oct 7, stating in an interview in Israeli TV (Channel 12, as reported by Times Of Israel, much earlier reported by Haaretz), that Hannibal Directive has been issued and admission - from the top military figure, no less - that civilians have been killed.
I just did the same. Absolutely awful. I assume OpenCode's heavy context is a problem, and it's probably better to use Liquid's own OpenCode alternative for this.
The amount of steering necessary is rapidly decreasing. You're looking at a way too small timeline if you think this will be sustainable, or you're hoping that LLMs will hit their peak very soon.
I guess it's up to interpretation, but I read it the complete opposite way, as in Linux distributions should not think so highly of themselves as to expect OpenBSD to conform and adapt to their mess, and OpenBSD rightfully should not be expected to "give a flying Fedora about Linux".
The standard itself being open is irrelevant. I'm not sure why this is always brought up for attestation standards. It is fundamentally impossible to trust the signature from open-source software or hardware, so a signature from open-source software is essentially the same as no signature.
So now, if we were to start marking all images that do not have a signature as "dangerous", you would have effectively created an enforcement mechanism in which the whole pipeline, from taking a photo to editing to publishing, can only be done with proprietary software and hardware.
We already have a centrally curated trust model in https. Browsers only treat connections as "secure" if they chain up to a root CA in their trust store. You can operate outside that system, but users will see warnings and friction. Some level of trust concentration isn’t new.
I'm curious if you think this is worse or not as bad as a best-case broad implementation c2pa...especially if there is a similar Let's Encrypt entity assisting with signatures.
I brought it up two years ago and get downvoted when I brought it up a couple months ago.
There is a story on the front page right now about someone losing their child's family videos from a youtube ban. We hear about this stuff all the time.
I suspect we are gonna be in somewhat of an arms race with AI products as the bubble grows over the next 18-24 months. This makes me worried about how disadvantaged people are going to be if they lose access to the better platform (whichever that ends up being).
Do you think AI is going to be so important that we would benefit from legal protections for access?
Or do you think the models and technology will become so small we will be able to personalize / decentralize the tech and it still be useful / competitive?
Happening already. My new claude max account got instabanned after just a few messages asking it to debug some stuff for me, that they felt like a TOS violation. Nothing remotely controversial. The main model didn't even complain, some dumber background censorship model flagged it.
This is not an easy fix. Charge backs will lead to life-time permanent bans. Which means you're now forced to buy an iPhone in order to pass store attestation for essential applications like banking apps, government ID, age verification, etc.
If you store sessions then you need to ensure the session has been replicated to every node before you can return it to the user. For revocation lists it is often acceptable that the token is still valid for a short while at some nodes while it is being replicated.
A revocation list is also not considered highly sensitive data, which would be another complexity layer when working with distributed data.
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