Bingo. The bigger story is that the float is not there so the companies are "public" in that they sell a small number of shares at IPO to get crazy market caps that then force the ETFs to buy stimulating demand. It's genius and infuriating at the same time.
It is a one-time technique for private investors to extract money from pensions.
I moved all my money outside US index and global index funds because of SpaceX and OpenAI. At least until these IPOs have passed I will not move any money back. The sheer size of these IPOs might trigger a market crash.
Homes last for 50+ years and are fixed objects that establish the visual look of our communities and outdoor space. They aren't disposable products. The way you get economies of scale is by repetitive builds and a highly optimized supply chain. You could get efficiencies if every home was built and looked the same but most people don't want to make that tradeoff
There are some things that could improve the situation. Post frame construction, Pre built trusses, macerating toilets that are more forgiving for sewer tie ins, localized instant hot so you don't have to run separate hot water lines, radiant heating so you don't have to run the duct work. It's all tradeoffs though and you aren't going to get a $500k house for $30k.
The other thing holding back progress are building codes and city laws. To be fair a lot of those codes exist for good reason but the inspection and permit system is suboptimal in most cases. You can buy a $30k small studio on Amazon right now that shows up on the back of a truck but good luck with your city allowing you to use it as a dwelling.
“I’ve got an individual that’s (experiencing) shortness of breath, very hot, thinks he’s going to pass out and producing a little bit of blood – coughing up some blood,”
and then seeing that he was hiking in the Sierra in California 5 days earlier https://x.com/KyleBusch/status/2055384870638309742 leads me to believe he developed blood clots and had a massive Pulmonary Edema that killed him.
PE's are no joke and can happen to young and fit people at times seemingly at random. Clotting can be triggered by genetic causes, dehydration, and long flights/drives without moving your legs but sometimes they just happen.
If your body doesn't absorb them they can tear off and go to your lungs or heart resulting in shortness of breath and coughing up blood. 20% of PE's kill people instantly with no warning which was shocking to learn about.
Wear your compression socks on long flights and get up and stretch your legs. Same for sitting at on office or going on long drives. And if your legs every feel heavy, hot, or sweaty for apparently no reason go directly to the ER. A d-dimer test and subsequently an ultrasound will confirm. The fix? blood thinners and monitoring until your body takes care of them.
They cover both the technology itself and its history, including the incidents you are reading about. These people are the ones who developed the methodology and the technology for nuclear device safety, or at least a significant chunk of it. I think it has recently become much more mathematically heavy, with zero knowledge proofs and other fancy stuff used to talk to the locks in the devices.
I'm a perfect world, artists would rent a facility and sell/resell their own tickets (or partner with a ticket processor that offers price caps on resales) thereby controlling the issuance and resale of tickets. In reality, the facilities often have their own deals with people like ticketmaster and the artist has no control. It works out for the artist because they lock in the msrp of every ticket and don't have to deal with demand. But it sucks for the fans. Capitalism.
Vs code extensions have been terrifying for a long time. Such a wild and obvious attack vector. I'm constantly getting pop ups in vscode to install an extension because it recognizes a certain file type. It's 50-50 whether that extension is owned by a company or some random dev. Some of these have millions of installs and on first glance appear to be official company owned extensions. I'm at a point in my life where I only installed official company owned extensions and even that is hard to be sure I'm not getting suckered. Sad state.
The problem extends far beyond VS code. All extensions and executable code has the same problem. There was a case where Disney was hacked because an employee installed a BeamNG mod that had bundled malware.
A company that wants to remain secure would have to employ strict restrictions on installing software. Only installing npm packages and plugins from an internal preapproved repo for example.
Running code isn't the problem. The fact that (almost) all code runs at the same security level is.
You regularly run tons of untrusted code when visiting websites. That code can't wreak havoc on your machine because it's well-sandboxed. Yet, if we advocate for sandboxing in more places, the "gun nuts of tech" scream about monopolistic practices and taking away user control.
Fully agree with the first half of your comment. The second half goes off the rails, though.
I rarely see people complain about sandboxing.
What people complain about is when devices are locked down in a way where you are only allowed to install software that is approved by a central gatekeeper, even though sandboxing is in place that should make it far safer to run arbitrary safer than on traditional desktop systems.
Agreed. What's frustrating is that we have models for how sandboxing can work and instead of investing efforts into nailing that experience, the OS providers are prone to turning it into a monetization/lock in layer instead. My VLC and VS Code should have an OS native way of being limited to particular functionality. But when the OS providers implement the sandbox, they center it around an App Store and restrictions on only apps that have been notarized where said notorization costs money or a requires a subscription. And then they remove the ability to do things which their own native apps can do and set tighter controlling rules on what APIs apps can ever have access to.
When all I wanted was for VLC or similar to run in a sandbox by default where a plug-in I install can't do anything to my system or access the internet by default because the software itself is restricted to just the files I'm using and that's it.
That exists on linux under flatpak, but it requires Wayland and Pipewire. Also many packages just request full system permissions rather than update to work in a sandbox.
It's in the works and one day we will have it but progress is slow.
I really like openbsd's pledge. It's nice when you look at the code and see the program restrict itself to a smaller set of operations. Not everything in ports has adopted it, and the point is moot for closed source. But for the latter, VM and an isolated segment would be the proper solutions.
> My VLC and VS Code should have an OS native way of being limited to particular functionality.
The problem is... it's hard to scope. A media suite such as VLC, simply by what it is intended to do, needs a lot of permissions. Read data from physical media drives (CD/DVD/BD), preferably directly against the device to circumvent DRM. Access the network 0.0.0.0/0 1-65536 TCP and UDP to be able to play all sorts of streaming media. Access all files the user has access to on the computer because everything can be a media file and no operating system available does MIME type detection. Write to files on the user's computer to do stuff like format conversions and screen recordings. Access the screen framebuffer and the user's microphone for said screen recordings. Open network listen sockets to be a streaming endpoint.
Unless filesystems get a distinct metadata field to each file, there really is no viable way to sandbox it.
A viable strategy is something like qubeos for isolating activities from each other. You can have a media vm, a dev vm, a bank vm, and a password/manager vm. Or you use different computers.
I think one issues has been having code hosting/build systems/deployment pipelines under one ecosystem with non scoped keys. Especially your deployment keys should be on a service that only interacts with inert archive (no building or downloading anything).
As a "gun nut of tech", I have resolved this issue for myself with two computing categories for hardware I use: Hardware-I-trust and Hardware-someone-else-trusts. Sometimes these share information, and have to interact. Usually I am the one who decides how. Smartphones have never been in the category of "Hardware-I-Trust". For the first time in a long while my current employer paid for hardware is in that category for reasons of my own.
> Yet, if we advocate for sandboxing in more places
Sandboxing plugins is pretty much universally desired? You seem to be conflating this with the issue of platform gatekeepers deciding which software is allowed to run on our own hardware
We've had the solution to shit like this, and it's called the SecurityManager in Java. No one wants to configure the damn thing, but it is there. Also, auditing the code you pull in. Yeah. Reading code sucks. Yeah. It's a lotta work. But if you don't check, you don't effing know.
All y'all want the fun of unprotected sex (rawdogging the ecosystem) and are starting to get burned by the VD's we old-timers have been hollerin' at you telling you will be coming the more you do this promiscuous dependency inclusion.
> Also, auditing the code you pull in. Yeah. Reading code sucks. Yeah. It's a lotta work. But if you don't check, you don't effing know.
While I do generally agree with this sentiment, it’s not always possible in the ways you imply:
- Plenty of systems pull packages that are not human readable. For example WASM plugins. Or it might even by in unfamiliar languages such as a Python package calling C.
- You might argue that “if you cannot understand the code then don’t use the package” but that isn’t always practical. Security packages will include maths that is beyond the average software engineer. Other performance-critical packages (such as libraries in the ML space) will have highly optimised code that isn’t easy for the average developer to read through.
- Some supply chain attacks have been targeting popular packages. So now you need to re-read every single point version (!!!) on every update. Heck, even using lock files to the patch version in semver might not save you for some language ecosystems because you can overwrite git tags. So a package version that is safe on your local machine might end up compromised when compiled via CI/CD.
- And then there’s CI/CD itself. We are seeing supply chain attacks in GitHub Actions plugins. So now you have to pin all of your actions to their SHA instead of semver.
There definitely needs to be a better security model to support developers because the current status quo makes it very hard to vet everything you run, and very easy to fuck up. In all other fields of IT, we’d say that was a failure of the process rather than a failure of the individual.
This is about as useful as telling people to read the full terms of services of everything they use. That might be easier than auditing every line of code you run.
I’ll tell my employer to put the feature on hold for 20 years while I read the source of every package.
Yes, because sandboxing gets us unusable OS like iOS or Android. It isn't a solution. Perhaps the gun nuts are right then. Better be a gun nut than a Google employee, probably.
Funnily enough a lot of this "extension sprawl" is caused by the _difficulty_ of installing tools on locked down Windows machines. I recently moved to a locked down SoE and instead of being able to use regular tools (which require a lengthy negotiation process to install) I now use extensions for absolutely everything, _because_ they're not currently policed in the same way...
At my last workplace I was not allowed to install JSON viewer/prettier extension for my browser, but I was allowed to install VScode with random JSON plugins.
Most sandbox systems today, take seatbelt from Apple for instance, only strip permissions. If your extensions without internet access calls a tool that needs it, boom access denied or worse, weird network issues.
One would need some kind of ring system where less privileged processes can call higher privileged processes with their own sandbox permissions.
Sure, that's the main challenge with building good sandboxing systems. But it's not actually that hard to do when the will to do it is there.
For example, Android already allows you to give apps restricted access to your media. My understanding of the way it works is that the resulting interface for picking photos etc. is not under the control of the app. The app only receives whatever file you picked.
Because it's hard to create a system that is both sandboxed and powerful. You can't have an extension system that allows a plugin to run a locally installed linter or view the status of docker containers but can't execute something malicious.
I do agree though that it is incredibly important to start taking sandboxing seriously. But there is a lot of difficulty and friction, and most of the users will scream and cry about extensions being limited.
Yes you can. Extension systems of today have multiple problems that prevent that. The basic assumption that has to go, though, is that a core application like VSCode can be written once, then be extended to infinity without the core evolving. That's an assumption you see everywhere in extension systems, and it restricts everything to "features or security, but not both".
Taking your examples:
> run a locally installed linter
VSCode and its extensions have certain files opened. The linter can do much less if it gets read-only access to those files, but not write access and no other files, not the open internet or something.
This has then to be coupled with those permissions being displayed before installing, allowing them to be reviewed by users as well as plugin repo curators. Basically listing those permissions as declarative metadata.
Because then a user or curator won't see "this plugin can read and write all your files" but "this plugin can read (but not write) the files being opened by VSCode". If the plugin wants to exfiltrate those files, the permissions would also list "this plugin can send HTTP requests to totally-legit-site.ru" instead of "this plugin gets arbitrary internet access".
Main lession: permissions are WAY too coarse. But if they are fine-grained, they will soon no longer match the evolution of extensions, so the core system has to evolve too.
> view the status of docker containers
"This plugin can view the status of all docker containers started by other VSCode extensions in the same VSCode window".
> users will scream and cry about extensions being limited
Are those the same users? We might need two different products here, "feature VSCode" and "secure VSCode".
I don’t know what linters you use, but the ones I like are the ones that show you problems in the workspace stably, not just in the files that happen to be open and altering as files open and close.
You can always improve, but pretending like there’s an easy solution is lazy - if it was easy it would have been done.
This was bad wording on my part. I wrote "open" but that should have been "files in the workspace/project". Really, "open" WRT files is so overloaded already, they can be in the workspace, have an editor tab open for them, or have an active file handle, to name just three.
> You can always improve, but pretending like there’s an easy solution is lazy - if it was easy it would have been done.
I claimed that it is possible, not that it is easy.
Im highlighting that defining that sandbox policy cohesively in a way that works for all the different extensions types you’d want to support and doesn’t overwhelm the user with permission fatigue is difficult as to be impossible.
Browsers have a different problem - they protect different websites against each other. The IDE should probably protect you against extensions being able to access arbitrary files on disk, but even that’s difficult (eg a bundled linter often wants to read user defaults in a central location. But protecting even further than that is even harder, especially as here where the access was to the actual repo not anything else.
These kinds of permissions lists have been mostly a failure in history. Users see a massive list of permissions, or permissions constantly changing between updates and just ignore them because there’s no way to reasonably audit them or take any action on them.
Securing VS code would require making malware that has access to the system impossible, not just making it add a permission to the permission list.
Ideally, the permission list is meant for curators which end-users trust and can rely on.
Also, historically, permission lists have been fine-grained but too coarse at the same time, meaning they were "fine" in the wrong way, based on what is easy to implement instead of what the user needs.
The shit show that's called lastpass, which I unfortunately know, was hacked because a developer installed a bad version of Plex Media Server on his work computer.
I've become equally paranoid about VSCode extensions. I remember using several other IDE's like Brackets, JetBrains, Sublime Text or Bluefish only having a few solid extensions to rely on to get my dev work done. Now it seems like anything you do, someone or some company has built an extension specifically for your task.
At this point I try and get the most done with the least amount of extensions period. That and trying to get the rest of my code off of Github is the other.
About the level of security in software I expect from the vendor who came up with “screenshotting your desktop every few seconds, OCRing those, and dumping the results to disk unencrypted in plain text”
I was feeling like sneering as well about how my emacs setup never caused any issues until I remembered emacs packages have zero protection whatsoever and can run anything anywhere, are ALL authored by some guy in Nebraska or Slovakia or something in their spare time :) but we don’t see any attacks since there’s so few of us still using emacs.
I'm guessing you're referring to the "Verified Publisher" blue checkmark next to the publisher's name and domain name, which proves the publisher owns the domain name and has 6+ months in the marketplace? https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/configure/extensions/exte...
(Separately, it doesn't help that MS doesn't allow VS Code forks to use the official marketplace, including as verified publisher doesn't seem to exist there - example: https://open-vsx.org/extension/esbenp/prettier-vscode )
Meanwhile Google acquired windsurf, released antigravity, and recently handicapped it for Google business workspace users by removing the AI Ultra plan for workspace. So the only real way to use antigravity is either being a Google employee or using a personal account and AI Ultra.
It was a sad surprise last week when we tried to upgrade the workspace AI plan for some of our team members to Ultra and it was gone. We're moving to Claude/Codex.
Yeah I've considered that as well. Was loving having everything in the same ecosystem and have been pleased with the Gemini 3.1 models. I still think this is a blip and Google will come around. It doesn't make any sense.
You're not missing much -- Claude is a better model for coding. That's what basically everyone at Google DeepMind uses and what I expect most other Googlers would choose to use IF they had access:
I am Not a googler, just a very good google user but hope those Googlers using them third party service providers' (other than Google) LLMs read this (manually critically thinking, not skimming via a LLM layer, losing structural human nuance) :
As an employee, I'm using Antigravity (CLI version) every day (because we can't use Claude) and it rules. I am way more productive than I was with CIDER-V, which itself was very nice.
The internal version is just slightly optimized for Google's unique developer environment (auth + cloud vm + google3) and is a dogfood version, meaning we get unstable features first. It's mostly the same thing though.
They just announced the Googlebook (a laptop), not to be confused with Google Books (their service for selling ebooks). It sounds like the mismanagement is right at normal levels.
I can guess: I am 3 weeks into a 4 week Ultra subscription and the amount of Claude Opus and Gemini Pro tokens that they give you on the subscription is very generous - I feel like I have been gorging on tokens, tidying up 25 years of my open source projects. When my one month subscription runs out I will miss it.
It's really baffling. Zero transition plan. I could see them offering something to businesses and not consumers. But the other way around has me scratching my head. I figured out how to get it working again with code assist, a gcp project, some custom json and a bunch of clicks in various places but even with plenty of quota for the Gemini models in gcp, antigravity fairly quickly told me I was out of quota for a week so they also have a tracker for antigravity quota that's separate.
Received this email yesterday. The initial read of the email made me think I was losing antigravity and gemini cli with no alternatives, until you read all the way to the bottom of the note. Looks like I can switch to the Enterprise plan which is cheaper (awesome) but it doesn't really tell me if I'm getting the same services and unlimited rate limits.
What's going on Google?? Also if you say you're taking something away from me, you should also point me to what to replace it with in the same sentence.
We are simplifying our Google Workspace AI add-ons to focus AI tool access on our core services. As part of this shift, we are removing the Workspace AI Ultra Access add-on as an offering. Starting July 7, 2026, you will no longer have access to this add-on and your existing AI Ultra Access add-on licenses will be automatically transitioned to the AI Expanded Access add-on. We’re providing you this update as our records indicate that one or more users in your organization are currently assigned a Workspace AI Ultra Access license.
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I've seen this at so many startups (and worked to patch the gaps and put in best practices) including those backed by top tier VCs. The problem is that it is rare for startups to have security minded people.
It's usually designers, people who can raise money, and generalists who can stitch together apis. It's not generally platform, db, or security minded people. The proliferation of things like vercel and supabase have exacerbated this.
So you get people deploying API keys client side and dbs without rls. Or deploying service keys client side when they should be anon. I mean really basic stuff.
> So you get people deploying API keys client side and dbs without rls. Or deploying service keys client side when they should be anon. I mean really basic stuff.
Claude Code will do this, and actively encourage bypassing any verification before pushing to prod. I saw that first hand with its attempted handling of a major CIAM provider, and then Vercel using whatever OAuth provider in the ol' transitive breach
That is common knowledge now, right? Or am I just smoking yellow tops
Yeah but Supabase yells really loudly if you have RLS turned off with their own AI agent, plus you can ask Claude to red team the platform to have it lock it down.
Yep, this has been my experience over 15 years in startups as well. There are barely any punishments, so there is no incentive for startups to change how they operate.
Same here. I've witnessed horrifying security bugs that were basically flagged as WONTFIX internally because it was too much work to fix until it was exploited.
I used to work at a startup that handled medical records. A HIPAA breach would have wiped out the company through reputation damage — because our customers were also subject to HIPAA and couldn't possibly hire a startup with a track record of HIPAA breaches.
In my personal assessment some individuals within leadership at this startup were highly risk-tolerant. I speculate that had those individuals been in leadership at other companies not subject to HIPAA, security practices would have been as lax and irresponsible as what's being described as the norm in this thread.
However, because of HIPAA, security practices at this company were fair-to-middling. There were certainly weak areas and mindless box-checking a la SOC-2, but it wasn't a complete shitshow. Those of us in the engineering deparment who cared were able to raise concerns and not have them dismissed, and were generally allowed to do things the right way.
My takeaway: when there are actual severe penalties for privacy breaches, startups may not be so cavalier with your data.
Honeastly though, I get it. If you have headcount for two people, do you want one of those people to be a DBA and another to be a platform architect? Whos going to actually make the app.
I genuinely think the problem is that frameworks don't do this for you. Why should you need a DBA and platform architect to make a multi tenant CRUD app, pretty much every one does the same thing..
Security minded generalists exist. They might move slower than you expect of a MFBS (move fast break shit) engineer, but you might also end up with fewer issues later.
there’s always some senior-ish person in the interview pool who is interested in security. hire them, let them figure things out and then give them permission to call bullshit on what you’ve done so far.
avoid hiring the “fanatics” tho. you don’t need E2EE everywhere.
And auth checks on the frontend. Or sometimes on the backend, but only on list pages. Or tables that still use INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT in 2026 (which is one way to definitely disprove your statements about 1000x growth).
In your opinion, is the lack of attention on security due to speed-bias or not having the expertise? For a startup / sole entrepreneur with very limited resources, what would be your advice?
IME it's always lack of experience, at least at the level being described here. It's the same kind of person adding CORS handling to a pure backend service for "security" reasons. They just don't know any better and don't have a good enough mental model of how it all fits together to be able to recognize when they need to research more. The insecure patterns being chosen instead usually aren't even easier or faster to implement.
I don't have any concrete recommendations other than that one really good senior+ engineer is more important than a legion of juniors early on. Basic security doesn't require an extra hire; it requires somebody experienced enough to build your product right.
Yeah, in most cases these security vulnerabilities are also regular bugs too.
I'll bet at some point someone contact this company and said "hey I'm being shown the wrong course" or "I can't access the material I just uploaded."
I've never seen anyone who got the basics right compromised because of some esoteric security issue. I'm sure it happens and probably will happen more now that it can be automated but it's usually a case of a system being left wide open.
Yeah what was said below. Lack of experience. A lot of people just don't know to ask about it or think through data flows. Running your code base through an llm asking it to act as a l7 security auditor, take it's time, think from first principles, and look for data leaks and potential security gaps in the code and architecture is a good start. Also don't ignore supabase when it gives you suggestions on things to fix.
As a solo entrepreneur you really have to prioritize your time but spending an extra day or two to think through everything using something like Gemini thinking or pro and an llm with an eye on security before you start taking customer data is probably a really good use of your time and you'll learn a thing or three. Just keep asking why and think critically.
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