Rebuilding strip from clean source doesn't clear it. The copy in the bootstrap seed modifies its replacement, and the replacement carries on from there. The provenance can still look normal.

The paper over complicates what's needed to maintain persistence between the different stages. It's not like the machine is turned off between them. You can simply keep a process running the whole time.

Rebuilding from clean source on a infected device. Whats the point? Could be every computer virus from 30 years ago.

Rebase an old branch and it suddenly looks recent again. The rewritten tip gets a fresh committer date.

Yes. This is what one wants, since if you have recently rebased it, you're clearly doing work with it. Meanwhile, branches you don't care to touch sink to the bottom of the list.

.gitconfig:

  ```
  [rebase]
      instructionFormat = %s%nexec GIT_COMMITTER_DATE=\"%cI\" GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=\"%cN\" GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL=\"%cE\" git commit --amend --no-edit%n
      committerDateIsAuthorDate = true
  ```

I would hope so

A replacement app could just send the vendor-signed image and leave the signature check to the device. Plenty useful once the official app disappears.

Anything in our stack is modern C++ if we can help it. If Mojo can replace those kernels without the Python runtime sitting underneath, even better.

I think your concrete treehouse counts too though. Add a shower and suddenly you need plumbing, drainage, the structure has to hold more weight. The overcomplicated part drags the overengineered part along with it. They pretty much collapse into the same thing.

That loop reads like a bug to anyone who hasn't memorized the wrapping rules. while (i-- > 0) on a signed index does the same thing.

Compiler mode won't catch the `extern "C"` thing though. Both sides compile happily, link blows up on mangled names. What I do is just keep a throwaway .cpp in tests that #includes the header and calls a few of the public functions. Dumb but it's basically the only thing that ever catches that case before some downstream user does.

Being a generalist isn't easy.

Most IAM policies start as "whatever made the deploy pass." Need rds:CreateDBInstance? Fine, rds:* it is. Ship it. Months later that same role can wipe the cluster and nobody remembers why it ever had that permission.

Separate accounts help, but only if someone actually goes back and cleans it up, which… yeah, doesn't really happen.