Law enforcement is using a third party (Flock) to get around constitutional requirements.
A camera pointed at a public street isn't the same constitutional question as LE searching a persistent database to reconstruct someone's movements. The latter falls into fourth amendment search territory.
Jesus, how many times are you just going to parrot the same replies over and over? No, the putting public facing camera video into a database does not make it a search. The case you cited, Chatrie vs. United States, involved the government demanding that Google hand over private cellphone location data on everyone inside of a geofence boundary. The court decided that forcing Google to hand over geolocation data was akin to forcing Google to hand over email contents, which requires a warrant. You're trying to turn around and interpret this to saying that the plain view doctrine doesn't apply to ALPRs, which record public spaces.
This isn't the case of law enforcement using a third party to get around constitutional requirements. The government could set up their own cameras doing exactly what Flock does, and it would still not violate anyone's constitutional requirements. Because people don't have a right to not be recorded in public, no matter how much you want that to be the case.
> Jesus, how many times are you just going to parrot the same replies over and over
The same amount that you do, dude. You're in every single one of these threads, and despite being proven wrong over and over again you keep being "confused" about how people are against this technology. Even in this thread, you keep responding with the same points based on your equivocation of an individual taking a picture in public and a state law enforcement organization aggregating and tracking individuals who haven't committed crimes.
Try reading some SC cases and actually paying attention to the responses you're getting.
And yet you still start yet another thread insisting that a database makes public facing video cameras a privacy violation.
When have I been "proven wrong over and over again"? The court cases you've cited are all about governments demanding private cell phone location information. You're trying to take decisions that amount to, "the police need a warrant to demand private cellphone location data from telecoms" and make the enormous leap to your imaginary decision, "the police cannot record people in public and search those recordings".
Just because the specific ALPR technology was not being litigated doesn't mean that the law doesn't apply to similar technologies. At issue here is the government being able to monitor and track people in public, not that photographs are ok because individuals can take them at will.
> A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz, 389 U. S., at 351–352. A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” Id., at 429 (opinion of Alito, J.). For that reason, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” Id., at 430.
Edit for your edit: you haven't refuted anything man, you keep trotting out the same arguments in those linked threads:
- The data includes "private movements" which is why it's unconstitutional (the SC said aggregation of public data can impel privacy concerns)
- An individual or LE can take a photograph of you or your house, therefore collecting photographs from geolocated cameras and tracking you over time is not constitutionally distinct (but it is)
- The specific technology at the center of these cases are not ALPRs, therefore the rulings have no bearing on Flock (despite the fact that courts are not litigating the specific technology, but rather the constitutional principles of their use)
> The data includes "private movements" which is why it's unconstitutional (the SC said aggregation of public data can impel privacy concerns)
But does it? You keep insisting this is the case, but your attempts to back up this claim are cases with totally different scenarios. Namely demanding that telecoms hand over location information.
> - An individual or LE can take a photograph of you or your house, therefore collecting photographs from geolocated cameras and tracking you over time is not constitutionally distinct (but it is)
The point is to emphasize that the information collected by Flock is in plain view. The plain view doctrine is well established. The police don't need a warrant to observe publicly visible things.
> The specific technology at the center of these cases are not ALPRs, therefore the rulings have no bearing on Flock (despite the fact that courts are not litigating the specific technology, but rather the constitutional principles of their use)
The cases you've cited all involved private information being obtained without a warrant. You can't just ignore the fact that a GPS tracker or cell phone location information also reveals private movements, as opposed to public facing camera which only record public activity.
Again, you keep citing decisions without bothering to understand the context behind the. For instance,
"To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz, 389 U. S., at 351–352. A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment);"
This is about the police planting a GPS tracker on someone's car - that's that "Jones" is referring to here. That case involved the police tracking someone in public and in private.
You're confusing the technology used in Jones with the principle Carpenter cited it for: a person can have a 4A privacy interest in the whole of their physical movements, including movements in public.
And for the second time, you're trying to dodge the distinguishing factor between Jones and Flock. The former tracked movements in public and in private. The latter, only in public. That, and the Jones case involved the police accessing someone's vehicle without a warrant.
You seem to be under the impression that the opinion of the court in the Jones was that everyone's public movements are private and the police need a warrant to track your public movements through and any all means. But that was not the decision of the court. The police and still just follow you, Jones notwithstanding.
You can desire your public movements to be protected by the Fourth amendment all you want, but that does not make it so.
I'm not claiming Jones held that cops need a warrant to visually follow someone on a public street. The point you're avoiding is that Carpenter expressly cited Jones for the proposition that people have a fourth amendment interest in the "whole of" their physical movements, and distinguished ordinary observation from technologically enabled, comprehensive tracking. Just because the camera is in public doesn't make it permissible.
And maybe it wasn't the decision in Jones, but Carpenter specifically cites Alito's concurrence for the proposition that a person has a 4A privacy interest in aggregation of movement data and describes GPS tracking in Jones as raising those privacy concerns.
As I've repeatedly explained, the Carpenter decision was narrowly scoped to cell phone location data. The decision did not do anything to restrict other forms of monitoring. The idea that Carpenter restricts governments' ability to video record public spaces is entirely your own invention.
ALPRs weren't connected to companies which call their detractors "terrorists" and which collect photographs into searchable databases that have advanced AI features. The general public has also witnessed the rise of military-style policing and unaccountable violence from law enforcement, so that contributes to the negative sentiment.
They weren't connected to nationwide databases which automatically record, store, and aggregate individuals' movements. Not constitutionally equivalent.
They haven't yet because a case hasn't made its way to the SC. But Chatrie and Carpenter deal with this exact subject matter and both establish that aggregating and searching past data is a (fourth amendment) search.
The specific technology being used to conduct the searches does not matter.
Persistent technological tracking of a person's public movements can constitute a search. The fact that each individual movement occurs in public does not automatically eliminate fourth amendment protection, nor does it matter that its a third party that does the collecting (Google, Flock, whoever). What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data.
It's not just the specific technology being used to conduct the search, it's that the information the police obtained Chatrie and in Carpender both included people's private movements. Your phone's GPS data doesn't just track where you drive on public roads, it also tracks you walking around your private property.
> The fact that each individual movement occurs in public does not automatically eliminate fourth amendment protection, nor does it matter that its a third party that does the collecting (Google, Flock, whoever).
Sure, doesn't eliminate Fourth Amendment protections: the police can't just search your car because it's in public. But that doesn't meant police can't record public spaces.
> What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data.
Recording public spaces isn't a Fourth Amendment search. That's what distinguishes Flock from the other cases you mentioned.
Carpenter is saying that public movements are part of the protected interest, not just the private movements which were also tracked. If the private movements hadn't been tracked in those cases, it would still be a 4A issue:
"A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, 'what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.'"
> But that doesn't meant police can't record public spaces.
> Recording public spaces isn't a Fourth Amendment search.
I'm not saying either of these things. The quote that you're responding to literally says "What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data". I don't care who collects the data (Flock, or Axon, or Google, or whoever): if the cops are searching a persistent database which monitors and tracks people over time, it is a 4A issue.
This is just an incorrect description of the ruling in Carpenter v. US. The core of the ruling is that the third-party doctrine doesn't apply to cell phone location data. The ruling was a very narrow one and did not affect other methods of monitoring.
> The Supreme Court's ruling in Carpenter was narrow and did not otherwise change the third-party doctrine related to other business records that might incidentally reveal location information, nor did it overrule prior decisions concerning conventional surveillance techniques and tools such as security cameras.
You're trying to expand the scope of the decision on Carpenter to encompasses video cameras, or location tracking in general, but that is not true.
> The quote that you're responding to literally says "What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data".
No, it does not. It says that public activity may be protected, not that it is protected. And you're conveniently ignoring the fact that this decision was narrowly scoped to the context of phone location data.
> if the cops are searching a persistent database which monitors and tracks people over time, it is a 4A issue.
Carpenter only established this in the context of phone location information. You're inventing your own decision when you try to expand this to public facing cameras.
I'm not talking about the specific ruling, I'm quoting the justification that the justices used in coming to that ruling, which is extremely relevant to modern day surveillance and whether LE using surveillance cameras from a third party to reconstruct people's movements constitutes unreasonable searches under 4A. Based on their arguments, it appears so.
> nor did it overrule prior decisions
I'm not saying it overruled prior decisions. I'm saying the reasoning of the judges has an effect on future surveillance technologies.
> You're trying to expand the scope of the decision on Carpenter to encompasses video cameras, or location tracking in general, but that is not true.
No, I'm saying that the same principles that led to the outcome of Carpenter also apply to technologically-assisted tracking (which includes LE using surveillance cameras to track movements over time).
> No, I'm saying that the same principles that led to the outcome of Carpenter also apply to technologically-assisted tracking (which includes LE using surveillance cameras to track movements over time).
And this is just a factually wrong statement about the Carpenter decision. The Supreme Court didn't apply the same principles to other methods of surveillance. They could have. But they did not, and instead gave a narrowly scoped decision that was limited to cell phone location data.
What you think the Supreme Court should have decided is irrelevant.
The legal reasoning I'm referring to is quite clear, even if it wasn't part of the court's final decision (it was part of the concurrence, though, which are also used in legal arguments):
> A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz, 389 U. S., at 351–352. A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Prior to the digital age, law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” Id., at 429 (opinion of Alito, J.). For that reason, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” Id., at 430.
You can continue to tell me that the court narrowed the scope of the final decision, but "A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere" is quite clear. Cool, the final decision narrowed the scope to cell phone location data; that is irrelevant to what we're discussing and doesn't negate that the concurrence literally states that part of the reasoning is that people don't lose 4A rights just because they're being surveilled in public:
> A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere
Just because you want to claim that cell phone location data is somehow completely distinct from photographic location data because people can take photographs in public doesn't make it so.
If it's not in the Supreme Court's decision then it doesn't matter as far as the law goes. At this point you've basically admitted that the Carpenter decision doesn't have any bearing on Flock, you're just trying to justify your earlier comments that you now realize aren't actually covered by the court cases you cited.
And even then your quotes are much weaker than you seem to think:
> what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”
"May be" means that there are some situations where it is protected, but also means ther exist other situations where it is not.
"the ball is blue", and "the ball may be blue" are two vastly different statements. Even if only a fraction of one percent of balls are blue, we can still make the statement "the ball may be blue".
> ...law enforcement agents and others would not — and indeed, in the main, simply could not — secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”
Flock cameras don't monitor every movement of a car - only where those cameras are present. Furthermore they're not secret: Flock cameras are publicly visible, and many governments public maps of where cameras have coverage.
You don't need a warrant to record people in public. You keep throwing around the term "surveil" as though this is a singular activity. Do the police need a warrant to search your house or car? Yes. Do they need a warrant to get Google to hand over your Gmail contents? Yes?
Do they need a warrant to photograph the exterior of your house? No. Do they need a warrant to photograph you in public? No
You keep missing that these aren't singular photographs. This isn't the 70s: these are persistent systems that aggregate video and photographs of everyone, tracking their movements over time. That is enough to make this constitutionally distinct from a cop taking a single picture of your house.
And? These are still videos of people in public. This information is in plain view. You keep insisting that if you aggregate public information it somehow becomes private information, but that's not true unless the Supreme Court makes some new precedence-setting decision.
That precedence-setting decision would be Carpenter v US [1], which established that being in public does not automatically eliminate all fourth amendment protection, and the comprehensive nature of government surveillance can matter constitutionally.
Carpenter v. United States was about the government accessing telecommunications data. This is not public information, location data also tracks people's movements on private property. Just like the other case you cited, Chatrie v. United States, this is a situation wholly removed from public facing video cameras.
Carpenter was not about who owned the data or the technology being used but rather the government reconstructing a person's movements over time, including movements occurring in public.
The fact that the data is owned by a private company or that some of it is considered private by the individual doesn't matter: it's about tracking individuals over time.
> Carpenter was not about who owned the data or the technology being used but rather the government reconstructing a person's movements over time, including movements occurring in public.
...and including movements occurring in private.
> The fact that the data is owned by a private company or that some of it is considered private by the individual doesn't matter: it's about tracking individuals over time.
More importantly, tracking their private movements over time, not just their public movements. You're hand waving away an important part of the case. And the decision does not extend to ALPR readers, from what I can tell.
> The Supreme Court's ruling in Carpenter was narrow and did not otherwise change the third-party doctrine related to other business records that might incidentally reveal location information, nor did it overrule prior decisions concerning conventional surveillance techniques and tools such as security cameras.
Trying to interpret Carter v. US as prohibiting public security cameras is a very big leap
> A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”
This would still be an issue even if they weren't recorded in private spaces. At issue here is the reconstruction of data, regardless of if it happened in public or private spaces.
Picking out one quote doesn't change the fact that the ruling in Carpenter was narrow, limited to cell phone location information. You're just wrong about the scope of Carpenter, and unwilling to accept that fact.
You're focused on the narrowness of the final ruling and not the vast legal reasoning that led to it.
Carpenter's reasoning concerning comprehensive records of an individual's movements (regardless of private or public) are relevant when LE uses aggregated Flock data to reconstruct a person's movements over an extended period.
Except the narrowness of the final ruling is exactly what makes it not impact the legality of Flock. It doesn't matter whether you think the courts decision should be extended to cameras - your opinion doesn't decide the law, the court's opinion does.
Except what I'm discussing is why the court went with that decision and how that reasoning applies to modern technology like Flock cameras. Your original argument was that cameras are in public and location data is private and includes private data, and the distinction is that you have no expectation of privacy in public. The court doesn't agree, and they've explicitly pointed out that 4A still applies when someone is being monitored and tracked in public.
> The court doesn't agree, and they've explicitly pointed out that 4A still applies when someone is being monitored and tracked in public.
Only when that tracking is done via cell phone location information. The Carpenter decision did not apply this to all forms of public monitoring. You keep ignoring the fact that the decision was narrowly scoped to cell phone location data, and continue to erroneously claim that it applied to public tracking in general.
Chatrie. It's about the use of the data, not the data itself.
Law enforcement searches a database of recorded, retained, aggregated data about people who have not committed crimes: this constitutes a fourth amendment search. Go ahead and record all you want, but when law enforcement decides to use that data, they have to get a warrant.
That case didn't cover public-facing cameras, that was about the government demanding telecoms hand over geolocation data on their users. The government was demanding that mobile providers hand over private data, akin to asking Google for your gmail contents.
This is far removed from a camera set up in a public space.
Chatrie held that the government conducted a fourth amendment search when it got the location data, even though the data was held by a third party. The reasoning was that the data revealed Chatrie's physical movements, not that Google itself was somehow a constitutionally private space.
It didn't just reveal Chatrie's movements, it revealed to movements of everyone in the geofenced area. And more importantly, it revealed movements even in private not just in public.
Again, this is far removed from a camera in a public space.
Chatrie was not about the dragnet capturing people in private spaces. It established that LE acquisition and aggregation of location information can constitute a fourth amendment search even when the observations are made in public.
But the observations in the Chatrie case weren't made in public. This was private information that only Google had access to, and law enforcement went and demanded that Google hand over that private information.
By contrast, a person can stand on a street corner with their phone and record everything a Flock camera records.
The SC's holding was that the government's acquisition of location data from a third party was itself a fourth amendment search because the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy wrt location data. So you're kind of agreeing with me here: the data is either private and subject to a warrant, or it is in public where individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy wrt aggregated location information.
And again, a person standing on a street corner is constitutionally distinct from LE following and tracking individuals movement over time.
> The SC's holding was that the government's acquisition of location data from a third party was itself a fourth amendment search because the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy wrt location data.
Specifically, the GPS coordinates logged by their cellphones.
> So you're kind of agreeing with me here: the data is either private and subject to a warrant, or it is in public where individuals do have a reasonable expectation of privacy wrt aggregated location information.
You're missing the point: Flock camera's don't record where people have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
> And again, a person standing on a street corner is constitutionally distinct from LE following and tracking individuals movement over time.
Wrong: as long as law enforcement are only tracking your movements in public, they don't need a warrant or probable cause.
The government does need a warrant to surveil me, though, and multiple court cases have found that using an intermediate third party doesn't absolve the government from adhering to the fourth amendment.
The government needs a warrant to search you, your home, your vehicle, your email, etc. The government does not need a warrant to record you in public spaces.
You're correct that the government can't use a third party to circumvent privacy laws. But privacy laws never prohibited what Flock does. The government could directly set up its own cameras in public, and nothing about that violated the Fourth Amendment.
The government does need a warrant to surveil someone, though. Which is what is happening here: a third party surveils citizens and the government searches that data.
Whether or not the government needs a warrant to surveil someone depends on how the government is conducting that surveillance. The government does, for instance, need a warrant to wiretap you. They do not need a warrant to record people in public spaces. Nor do they need a warrant to, say, photograph the exterior of your house.
But they need a warrant to follow me around, record my movements, put them into a database which is searchable by other law enforcement. They're not taking a single photograph of a car, they're creating a database of movement of people who have not committed crimes.
If they're only tracking your movements in public, the no they do not. Again, you're just wrong about what privacy laws protect. They do not prohibit the police from surveilling or tracking you, they only control how the police is able to conduct that surveillance. If the police want to search your house or car, they need a warrant or at least probable cause for the latter. If they want to photograph you in public, they do not.
Police do need a warrant to place a GPS device on your vehicle.
Data continuity is a function of data point frequency [0]. If all public space (and some participating private space) is monitored, the practical difference between a GPS device and a retroactive dragnet system disappears.
You are correct that police do not require a warrant to follow someone around in public, but these systems aren't that, and in practice much closer to the GPS tracking, which does require a warrant. It's unclear without trying this further in court which this should qualify as.
IMO: If the system has seen me exit the public space outside my home, or work, or someone elses home, or a store, or whevever, the system knows where I am at all points in time, like a GPS, with very little exception.
> The government does not need a warrant to record you in public spaces.
This is not true. The question is whether you have a "reasonable expectation of privacy." If you do, then the government needs a warrant. This is why the government can't tap a payphone without a warrant even though it is in public.
It is true that a single police officer can post up somewhere and scan license plates without a warrant. The difference here is scale. The question of whether scale affects a "reasonable expectation of privacy" has never been addressed by the supreme court, though it has been raised before and discussed in concurring opinions.
> This is not true. The question is whether you have a "reasonable expectation of privacy." If you do, then the government needs a warrant. This is why the government can't tap a payphone without a warrant even though it is in public.
"Reasonable expectation of privacy" covers things like restrooms. Not highways, streets, parking lots, etc. This isn't relevant for Flock.
"Reasonable expectation of privacy" covers whatever the public believes is reasonable. The original case creating this doctrine was about phone booths.
This is a western take on the situation. Another take would be that the US/Israel are the largest force for destabilization in the middle east (see also Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Iran itself from 1953-onward).
> They would not stand a chance
The west would absolutely lose a ground war in Iran. Iran has been preparing for an invasion for 50 years, the terrain isn't like other countries in the region and is incredibly hostile to a ground invasion, and the IRGC will fight to the bloody end (see also the Iran-Iraq war).
I don't agree with bin Laden or his methods, but that's not in this letter.
In the first section of the letter, "Why are we fighting and opposing you?", he describes atrocities committed by the United States and its allies. I think that part is what people reference as "astute points."
You don't have to love a person to understand or consider their ideas. Ted Kaczynski is a good example of an American intellectual with many philosophically worthy ideas, even if you find his methods horrific.
The points in my comment are in the letter, albeit in doublespeak (eg: "You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women.")
I omitted the reasonable points from Bin Laden's letter to focus on those that show what a wingnut he was.
People who resort to violence against civilians are largely wingnuts. I'm saying that most people who seriously consider his ideas are engaging with his geopolitical analyses, not his religious fanaticism.
You exemple supports Bin Laden's sanity, isn't ? It's a pertinent idea that is already discussed in our western society : the usage of woman corpse to produce sexual arousal may not be aligned with a better condition for the others women.
Whether you agree or not doesn't matter, neither if the proposition has been debunked.
> [It argues] that the Industrial Revolution began a harmful process of natural destruction brought about by technology. Furthermore it states that forcing humans to adapt to machinery creates a sociopolitical order that suppresses human potential and freedom. [...] The manifesto states that the public largely accepts individual technological advancements as purely positive without accounting for their overall effect, including the erosion of local and individual freedom and autonomy.
Would you mind spelling them out? Because all I find hovers between old fashioned reactionism and bat shit craziness. What is the philosophical value in that?
Parent poster probably should have mentioned Ellul, who the unabomber was heavily influenced by. Makes it easier for people who simply pattern match based on culturally enforced taboos instead of reading the source material and drawing their own conclusions.
To begin, I'm most interested in his argument that technology can become autonomous to the point that human beings can no longer control it and will become reliant on it, undermining human agency. AI will accelerate this issue and will be used by elites to subjugate lower classes.
From the Wikipedia page for Industrial Society and Its Future:
> [He argues] that the Industrial Revolution began a harmful process of natural destruction brought about by technology. Furthermore it states that forcing humans to adapt to machinery creates a sociopolitical order that suppresses human potential and freedom. [...] The manifesto states that the public largely accepts individual technological advancements as purely positive without accounting for their overall effect, including the erosion of local and individual freedom and autonomy.
This leads to some interesting questions. Do human beings still have autonomy if we allow our decisionmaking to be offloaded to machines? Is technological progress for the sake of progress a good thing? Does it serve humanity? If it does serve humanity, who does it serve and at what cost? What does our society become when human beings no longer have purpose?
Are you also comparing benefits and cost of living? That fast food worker cannot afford an apartment, groceries, or healthcare after taxes. God help them if they have children. Further, what little safety nets that exist in the United States are being gutted by the current administration and the likes of DOGE, which was run by a billionaire who paid a massive sum of money to the current administration to be put in a position to cut government benefits.
Wow, there's so much wrong with this "statistical analysis" to the point of absurdity. Goes to show that even a 30-year economics professor can be duped by AI.
It looks like his results are taken from the Federal Reserve 2022 Survey of Consumer Sentiments. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scfindex.htm The data is publicly available. I don't think that this was hallucinated.
Can you tell me how the table of numbers was generated? All it says is that it was "calculated" by ChatGPT. This guy is an econ professor; where's his reproducible methodology?
Further, he's treating this 2022 snapshot as a timeseries as if the various categories are tracking the same people over time. Just because 80 year olds in the data are wealthier than the younger brackets doesn't mean that those are the same people (in fact, those 80 year olds are boomers who grew up during a time of unprecedented financial growth and stability in the US, and who currently own a massive amount of housing in the US and are refusing to retire and allow younger people to take their high-paying jobs).
I can continue but those are the most egregious issues to begin with and I'm tired of reading this slop.
I was going to say something similar: invoking one’s credentials as a professor only counts for legitimacy if that 30-year legacy of thinking on the topic is applied to the problem under discussion.
In my opinion, if the analysis is offloaded to the plagiarism machine, it loses all epistemological value.
People who are well-versed in fields like fashion will create original designs which include yarn requirements, needle size, measurements, stitch instructions, construction steps, etc etc and sell them in online marketplaces like Etsy or Revelry.
Oh, I'm familiar with that; I thought that the parent meant that there are people who make money directly from the copyright on the patterns rather than the artifacts they sell. Are there?
Yes, that’s correct. There are people who make money directly from the copyright on the patterns. The parent commenter means that the people referenced are selling the patterns, not the garments.
Is this some kind of trick question or am I just misunderstanding your reply?
As far as I know they sell the patterns, not the finished knitted artifact. Aspiring knitters buy them to enjoy knitting. The physical representation of the pattern isn't worth anything (just a piece of paper), what you're buying is a license to use their intellectual property, so I'd say they're making money from copyright.
A camera pointed at a public street isn't the same constitutional question as LE searching a persistent database to reconstruct someone's movements. The latter falls into fourth amendment search territory.
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